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Using register-based panel data covering all Finnish firms in 1999-2004, we examine how 
corporations anticipated the 2005 dividend tax increase via changes in their dividend and 
investment policies. The Finnish capital and corporate income tax reform of 2005 creates a 
useful opportunity to measure this behaviour, since it involves exogenous variation in the tax 
treatment of different types of firms. The estimation results reveal that those firms that 
anticipated a dividend tax hike increased their dividend payouts by 10-50 per cent. This 
increase was not accompanied by a reduction in investment activities, but rather was 
associated with increased indebtedness in non-listed firms. The results also suggest that the 
timing of dividend distributions probably offsets much of the potential for increased dividend 
tax revenue following the reform. 
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1. Introduction 
 
While the theoretical analysis of the impacts of taxing corporate income on dividend and 
investment behaviour is well developed, there is still considerable uncertainty about the 
empirical magnitudes of these effects. Recent studies have, nonetheless, successfully utilised 
policy reforms to isolate the causal impacts of tax changes. Such evidence is available, in 
particular, for the Anglo-Saxon countries (see, for instance, Bond et al. (2007) for UK 
evidence and Chetty and Saez (2005) and Auerbach and Hassett (2007) for the US).  
This paper makes use of the Finnish corporate and capital income tax reform of 2005 to 
examine the impacts of dividend tax changes on dividend distributions and investments. The 
reform was the first major attempt to revise the tax rules for capital income since the tax 
reforms in the early 1990s, which introduced the dual income tax and the system of 
imputation credit. The 2005 reform especially lead to increased taxation of dividends received 
by individual investors from domestic firms listed on the stock exchange.
1 The taxation of 
dividends paid to institutional investors or foreign owners was not changed. In closely held 
corporations, dividends up to a certain threshold level were kept tax free.
2 The 2005 reform 
therefore increased the dividend taxation of some, but not all enterprises, and the tax 
treatment was based on determinants, such as ownership structure, that were to a large extent 
exogenous to the firm at the time of the reform. All this suggests that the reform involved 
sufficient exogenous variation in tax treatment, and it therefore opens up a promising avenue 
for empirical work. The reform can also be used to shed light on effects of dividend taxation 
under the dual income tax. This can serve as a guide to proper design of institutional details of 
the dual tax system, something that may be useful outside the Nordic countries as well. 
In more detail, we investigate how firms – both listed and non-listed corporations with 
domicile in Finland – changed their behaviour in anticipation of the 2005 tax reform in 2003–
2004. We examine the changes in dividend distributions, real investment and debt financing 
making use of register-based panel data, covering all Finnish firms from 1999 to 2004. 
The reasons why we focus on the announcement effects are threefold. First, it is of interest per 
se to learn to what extent firms minimise their tax burden over time. This behaviour is likely 
to be especially pronounced within corporate and capital income taxation, since the timing of 
                                                 
1 The combined tax rate on distributed profit rose from 29 to 40.5 per cent.    2
investment decisions and dividend distributions can be altered more easily than, for example, 
individuals’ labour supply. Based on experiences from the US 1986 tax reform, Slemrod 
(1992) proposes a three-tier hierarchy of behavioural responses to taxation, where the timing 
of tax payments is at the top (the biggest impacts), while real behavioural changes are at the 
bottom. Second, anticipatory responses may be problematic from the policy maker’s point of 
view. They can reduce revenues and thus make the scope for efficiency-improving tax 
reforms narrower. Anticipatory responses can also differ in sign and size from the long-term 
effects, and this could be in contradiction to the original goals of the reforms.
3 Third, in order 
to estimate the true impacts of the tax reform, it is important to obtain a proxy of to what 
extent the reform was anticipated. If this were not to be taken into account, one could 
mistakenly compare e.g. post-reform dividend levels to pre-reform values that are abnormally 
high because of anticipation behaviour. 
How should we expect dividend tax changes to affect firm’s decisions? Auerbach (2003) and 
Gordon and Dietz (2006) survey the still unsettled theoretical literature on the subject. The so 
called ‘old view’ of dividend taxation assumes that dividends are sticky and the marginal 
source of financing of investment is new share issues. It predicts that a tax change affects both 
investments and dividends. The ‘new view’ argues instead that dividend tax capitalizes into 
the share values and is neutral with respect to investment and dividend decisions. This view 
relies on the assumption that the marginal source of financing is profits and dividends are de-
termined as a residual item after investments. However, a temporary dividend tax change in-
duces a timing effect to dividends and investments, hence affects firm behaviour also under 
the ‘new view’ model (Auerbach and Hasset 2007). This case was discussed during the US 
2003 tax reform debate,
4 but the idea should be applicable also when a tax change is announ-
ced long before its actual implementation; the Finnish 2005 tax reform could be a case in 
point. In addition, under non-linear dividend tax schemes, the firm’s cost of capital may be 
dependent of dividend taxation even under the ‘new view’ assumptions. Lindhe et al. (2004) 
and Hietala and Kari (2006) analyse such features of the Finnish dividend tax system.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
2 For more information on the exemption, see sec. 2.1.  
3 Problems of anticipated tax policies have been addressed among others by  Auerbach (1989), who argues that 
they may be of opposite direction to the long-run effects of reforms. Alvarez et al. (1999) show analytically how 
an anticipated tax rate cut can lead to a sharp short-run increase in investments during the transitional period.   
4 The US dividend tax cut was legislated to expire at the end of 2008.    3
The determinants of dividend distributions have been studied empirically especially in the US 
and the UK. A large number of papers examine the impacts of tax reforms on firms’ policies, 
in particular the tax reforms passed in the US in 1986 and 2003. In the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 (TRA) the tax rates on ordinary income and capital gains were set at the same level. 
There was still a tax disadvantage with dividends because capital gains were only taxed on 
realization. Several studies argue that the TRA affected firms and that firms adjusted dividend 
payout ratios subsequent to the passage of the TRA.
5 In mid-2003 the tax rates on both divi-
dends and capital gains were reduced for individual investors, thereby simplifying and greatly 
reducing the level of equity taxation (The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003). Chetty and Saez (2005) establish a causal link between the tax cut and increased divi-
dend activity. They conclude that the tax cut led to increased dividend initiations. They also 
report that dividend increases are positively related to share ownership by managers.
6 Bond, 
Devereux and Klemm (2007), in turn, examine the impacts of the dividend tax change in the 
UK in 1997. They find that the tax change led to a predictable change in the type of dividends 
but otherwise it had limited impacts on the overall level of dividends and investments, thus 
supporting the new view. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the key features of the two proposals for the Fin-
nish 2005 tax reform and derives theoretical hypotheses of how different firms would react to 
the reform. Section 3 describes the dataset and our empirical approach. The estimation results 
regarding whether dividend distributions of firms in different tax categories reacted in differ-
ent ways are presented in Section 4. Section 5 examines how dividend changes were reflected 
in investment policies and debt decisions. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical predictions based on the 2005 tax reform 
 
2.1 The reform 
 
Dividend taxation before the 2005 reform 
 
                                                 
5 Examples of studies of the US 1986 tax reform include Ben-Horim et al. (1987), Bolster and Janjigian (1991) 
and Casey et al. (1999). 
6 Examples of other studies of the US tax reform of 2003 include Brown et al. (2004), Blouin et al. (2004), Nam 
et al. (2004).    4
A notable feature of the Finnish income taxation is that it follows the Nordic dual income tax 
(DIT). In that system, personal capital income such as dividends, capital gains and rental in-
come are taxed at a flat-rate tax. All other income is classified as earned income and taxed 
according to a progressive tax rate schedule.
7 Prior to the 2005 tax reform the tax rate on capi-
tal income and corporate profits was 29 per cent
8, while the top marginal tax rate (MTR) on 
earned income was around 55 per cent.    
As to the taxation for dividends, Finland applied a full imputation system to relieve the double 
taxation of distributed profits. The system led to a zero effective tax rate on dividends at the 
shareholder level, due to equal tax rates on corporate profits and personal capital income. 
Dividends from non-listed corporations received special treatment, however. These dividends 
were split into capital income and earned income to curb income shifting caused by the wide 
tax rate gap between these income types. The proportion of dividends taxable as capital in-
come was calculated as a 9.585 per cent return on the firm’s net assets. The residual part was 
taxed as earned income. This dividend split concerned all domestic corporations not quoted 
on the main list of the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HSE).   
The 2002 Arvela report 
 
In October 2002 a tax reform panel appointed by the Ministry of Finance and chaired by Mr. 
Lasse Arvela handed down its report on reforming the Finnish capital income taxation. 
Among its main proposals were reductions in capital income and corporate tax rates from 29 
to 25 per cent and a move from the imputation system to full double taxation of dividends. 
The splitting of non-listed dividends would also have been abolished. The proposal would 
have meant a substantial increase in the taxation of dividends taxable as capital income from 
29 per cent to 43.5 per cent. For those dividends, then taxed as earned income, the proposal 
would have caused a potential reduction in the tax burden. (Table 2.1) 
The 2005 reform  
The panel’s tax reform model did not meet with the support of the Finnish government, which 
came up with its own blueprint in November 2003. The final bill passed by parliament in June 
                                                 
7 The total tax liability on earned income consists of several parts. Church tax, local income tax and sickness 
insurance contributions are paid at flat rates, while the central government income tax is progressive. There is an 
additional social security contribution paid by wage earners on wage income. 
8 The flat capital income tax rate was 25 per cent in 1993–1995 and 28 per cent in 1996–1999.    5
2004 and implemented as from 2005 closely followed the 2003 blueprint, especially in terms 
of dividend taxation.  
The government bill included the following features. The corporate tax rate was cut to 26 and 
the capital income tax rate to 28 per cent. Instead of full double taxation of dividends, the 
government chose a system of partial relief under which 70 per cent of dividends were 
included in the recipient’s taxable capital income. The splitting system was maintained. A 
major exception from the main lines of the new dividend tax system was that the capital 
income part of dividends from non-listed corporations was made tax-exempt up to a fixed 
amount of 90,000 euros. Any amount beyond that was taxed according to the main rule. The 
70 per-cent rule was also applied to the earned income part of the dividend. (Table 2.1) 
Table 2.1   Dividend taxation before and after the 2005 reform 
  Previous tax system  The Arvela proposal 
(announced 2002) 
The 2005 reform 
(announced 2003) 
Tax rate on corporate profits  29  25  26 
Personal tax rate on capital income   29  25  28 
Top MTR  on earned income
9    55  55  55 
Method of dividend taxation  







Splitting parameter (effective)  9.585  -  9 
ETR (nominal) on capital gains   12  13  14 
Combined tax rate on dividends: 
    Listed firms : 
       HSE main list 
       HSE OTC list 
    Non-listed firms 
        Capital income   ≤ 90 t€ 
                                > 90 t€ 
        Earned income (Top MTR) 



























2.2 Theoretical predictions 
Dividend tax and the timing of dividends  
It is widely agreed on in tax literature that a constant dividend tax should not affect the timing 
of dividends of a mature corporation (Hartman 1985, Sinn 1987, Auerbach-Hasset 2007). 
This can be demonstrated by writing the expression for the value of the firm: 
                                                 
9 Top MTR of 2004. Observe that neither the Arvela report nor the Government proposal included cuts in the 
MTR on earned income. Some smaller cuts were eventually implemented, however. 
10 Prior to the 2005 reform, dividends from companies quoted on the OTC list were split into capital income and 
earned income.    6
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where τ is the rate of dividend tax, D(s) is the dividend distribution at time s and ρ is the own-
er’s discount rate. We observe that the firm’s value depends on the tax term (1-τ ) and the 
present value of dividends. Hence, the valuation of the firm is invariant to the timing of divi-
dends.  
If the tax rate unexpectedly changes, increases for example, the firm’s value changes accord-
ingly. This change has still no effect on the time pattern of dividends if the present value of 
dividends does not change.   
One crucial assumption of this simple example is that the tax rate is expected to stay constant 
in the future. If we relax this assumption and consider an expected future increase in the divi-
dend tax rate, occurring at time t’>t, we observe that the value of the firm is not any more 
independent of the timing of dividends. Assuming that the present value of dividends is un-
changed, the firm’s value can be raised by increasing distributions before and reducing them 
after the tax change. Thus, the value-maximizing firm’s response to the announced later divi-
dend tax hike is to advance dividend payments. 
Based on this short discussion it seems reasonable to expect that the Finnish 2005 tax reform 
caused anticipatory responses in the firms’ pay-out behaviour during the transitory period 
before the implementation date.   
Effects of the splitting system on dividends 
The split of dividends from non-listed firms, a special feature of the Nordic DIT, has received 
some attention among tax economists. Lindhe at al. (2004) and Hietala and Kari (2006) show 
that the split affects investment incentives and may reduce the cost of capital to a low level. 
Kari and Karikallio (2007) discuss the implications of the splitting system for dividend 
distributions. They show that a non-listed corporation’s optimal pay-out policy may well be to 
distribute exactly the maximum amount of dividends taxable as capital income. This policy 
rule combined with investment of the remainder of after-tax profits in financial assets is 
argued to be a value-maximizing way to avoid high taxes on earned income. Thus the pay-out 
policy of these firms is considerably affected by the tax rules.    7
Hypotheses  
To establish a causal role of the Finnish 2005 dividend tax increase, we exploit the fact that 
the tax changes only affected dividend income distributed to individuals. There was, however, 
considerable variation in the tax changes also within this dividend category (see sec. 2.1). The 
prime example of these is dividends from non-listed corporations taxable as capital income, 
which remained tax exempt up to the amount of 90,000 euros. One further aspect affecting 
our hypotheses is that the ceiling for dividends taxable as capital income makes dividend 
decisions very rigid for those non-listed firms for which this ceiling is binding. Thus we do 
not expect to see any anticipatory response among these firms. 
In establishing our hypotheses we divide firms into 5 different groups depending on their 
stock market status, ownership structure and the amount of dividend distributions; that is, the 
classification is based on factors that are relevant to the expected effect of the tax change. 
1.  Corporations quoted on the main list of the HSE with the majority of shares owned by 
foreign or domestic institutional investors 
2.  Corporations quoted on the main list of the HSE with a large share of domestic 
ownership  
3.  Non-listed corporations with dividends taxed as earned income at the margin
11 
4.  Non-listed corporations with dividends taxed at the margin as capital income, 
maximum dividend payment below 90,000 euros 
5.  Non-listed corporations with dividends taxed at the margin as capital income, maxi-
mum dividend payment above 90,000 euros 
The non-listed corporations above include firms quoted on the OTC list. The classification of 
companies into groups 1 and 2 was made on the basis of whether Finnish natural persons 
owned over 50 per cent of the company in 2004.
12 Our approach relies on the assumption that 
firms do not change groups frequently. This assumption seems plausible, since firm owner-
                                                 
11 Put differently, the ceiling for dividends taxable as capital income is binding. 
12 We also tested the use of a proportional share of ownership by domestic individuals as a continuous variable in 
our estimation models. Those results did not differ significantly from those generated by using the share of 
ownership as a category variable.   8
ship and pay-out policy tend to include much inertia. To assess this issue, we show in Appen-
dix 1 the proportional shares of the firms which have switched groups. The appendix also 
provides sensitivity analysis under different definitions of the corporate group number 5. 
The information of the Arvela proposal became public in October 2002 and that of the gov-
ernment proposal in November 2003. Considering that these two proposals differed very 
much in how they were expected to affect different groups of taxpayers, we build two differ-
ent hypotheses. The first one reflects a response to the Arvela report and should be seen in 
dividends paid out of the 2002 profits; the other relates to the response to the 2003 govern-
ment proposal and should be seen in dividend payments out of the 2003 profits.  
Concerning the Arvela report, Table 2.1 suggests that in almost all cases, dividend taxation of 
individual shareholders would have increased. The exceptions are dividends taxable at the 
margin as earned income by a natural person (group 3) and dividends received by a foreign 
investor or a Finnish institutional investor (group 1). Thus we hypothesize that the Arvela 
2002 report induced an anticipating increase in dividend payments in companies in groups 2, 
4 and 5. These groups are our treatment groups in 2003, measured by our Treatment03 vari-
able. This variable takes value 1 for firms in the treatment groups in 2003 and 0 otherwise, for 
all other years and all other groups. 
Again as seen from Table 2.1, the 2003 government proposal raised the level of dividend 
taxation for listed companies and for those non-listed companies which paid out dividends of 
an amount exceeding the 90,000 euro threshold. For the rest, the level of the tax burden was 
broadly unchanged. These latter cases include non-listed companies with dividends below the 
threshold and non-listed companies with dividends taxed at the margin as earned income. 
Hence we hypothesize that the 2003 government proposal induced an increase in dividends in 
firms in groups 2 and 5. These are our treatment groups in 2004, measured by our 
Treatment04 variable and coded 1 for firms in these groups in 2004 and 0 otherwise, for all 
other years and all other groups. 
   9
3. Data and the empirical approach 
 
The panel data employed contains information on the financial statements and taxation of 
Finnish corporations in the period 1999–2004. It was collected by the Finnish Tax 
Administration and is based on firms’ tax declarations. The dataset also includes tax return 
information on the principal shareholders of all dividend-distributing corporations.  
In comparison to similar studies that use smaller data sets, an important quality of our data is 
that there is no restriction on the size of the firm or the sector it operates in. It covers all 
Finnish firms that are subject to taxation and thus small firms make up the vast majority of the 
data. Table 3.1 presents some descriptive statistics of the key variables we have used in our 
estimations. We have classified firms into listed and non-listed firms. We have also divided 
firms into treatment and control groups according to the final reform proposal. On average, 
listed firms that were affected by the tax reform were smaller than firms in the control group, 
whereas non-listed treated firms were bigger than the control firms. However, as will be seen 
below, the trends in their dividend distributions before announcing the reforms were very 
similar. 
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2 we compare the pattern of median dividends between the treatment and 
control groups in the period of 1999–2004. Until 2003 the changes in median dividends have 
been quite similar in both groups. The most interesting observation is a considerable increase 
in treatment group dividends compared to control group dividends in 2003 and 2004: both 
listed and non-listed corporations anticipated the 2005 dividend tax increase via changes in 
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Table 3.1     Descriptive statistics 1999-2004 
 
                 
Listed corporations  Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Treatment group       
Dividend / Assets  209  0.03  0.05  0.00  0.38 
Profit / Assets  283  0.06  0.10  -0.55  0.65 
Investment / Assets  272  0.05  0.11  <0.001  1.32 
Equity / Debt  271  2.08  7.80  0.011  23.62 
Growth rate  201  0.08  1.16  -0.31  0.97 
Ln(Employment)  292 5.61 1.24 1.10 8.88 
Debt / Assets  236  0.20  0.16  <0.001  0.98 
Control group       
Dividend / Assets  314  0.08  0.14  0.00  1.57 
Profit / Assets  327  0.09  0.13  -0.24  0.82 
Investment / Assets  427  0.06  0.22  <0.001  5.65 
Equity / Debt  397  1.21  9.18  0.001  37.40 
Growth rate  422  0.02  1.19  -0.76  1.00 
Ln(Employment)  345 6.03 1.19 0.69  10.28 
Debt / Assets  392  0.20  0.16  <0.001  0.98 
       
       
Non-listed corporations  Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Treatment group (2004)       
Dividend / Assets  7156  0.07  0.08  0.00  0.99 
Profit / Assets  7702  0.09  0.12  -0.49  0.90 
Investment / Assets  7120  0.04  0.09  <0.001  1.46 
Equity / Debt  7478  1.37  8.06  0.002  46.78 
Growth rate  7048  -0.001  0.36  -1.95  1.00 
Ln(Employment)  7449 2.86 1.19 0.69 6.95 
Debt / Assets  7474  0.16  0.15  <0.001  0.99 
Control group       
Dividend / Assets  154623  0.06  0.08  0.00  1.00 
Profit / Assets  478321  0.07  0.11  -0.50  0.90 
Investment / Assets  247177  0.09  0.27  <0.001  1.50 
Equity / Debt  413235  2.30  11.16  <0.001  99.98 
Growth rate  336055  -0.029  0.58  -5.00  4.98 
Ln(Employment)  332931  1.58 1.01 0.69 7.77 
Debt / Assets  407577  0.29  0.21  <0.001  1.00 
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The Finnish 2005 tax reform allows us to use a simple difference-in-difference estimation 
strategy by providing exogenous variation in tax rate changes.  We therefore estimate 
equations of the following type  
(1)  t , i t , i t , i t g t , i i t , i 04 treatment 03 treatment X d ε η δ β α + + + + + + = , 
In Eq. (1),  t i d ,  refers to the dependent variable of firm i at time t,  g δ  is a dummy variable for 
each group of firms,  t η  is a time dummy and  t i, ε  is the individual error term, assumed to be 
distributed independently across firms. In some specifications, we also let the constant vary 
by firm and that is why it also has the subscript i. Once more, the treatment03 variable is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm expects to face an increase in dividend 
taxation after the tax reform and 0 otherwise according to the Arvela proposal. The 
treatment04 variable refers, in turn, to the Government Proposal. The treatment variables 
differ across groups of firms and over time
13. Finally, in some equations we include a number 
of other control variables, denoted by t i X , β .  
The identifying assumption is that other potential unobservable factors of dividend or 
investment behaviour affect the treatment and the control groups in the same way. Apart from 
the tax change, we do not see any other major reasons that would have a differential impact 
on firms differing in their ownership status and the dividend level over this time period. To 
further examine the credibility of our treatment/control group division, we estimated models 
where we used business profits as a dependent variable and the same set of explanatory and 
control variables as in our reported estimations. These model specifications did not produce 
significant coefficients for our treatment variables.
14 
 
4. Estimation results for dividend distributions 
 
We follow Chetty and Saez (2004, 2005) and estimate both extensive and intensive responses 
in dividend payout policy. In our paper the extensive margin refers either to the initiation of 
                                                 
13 We also estimated models using only one treatment variable which was combination of Treatment03 and 
Treatment04 variables. This treatment variable was significant in all model specifications. Noticing this, the 
Arvela and Government effects can be estimated together or separately. These results are available from the 
authors upon request.   13
dividend distributions by firms that had not paid dividends earlier or to a discrete change in 
dividend policy of non-listed firms that had earlier paid dividends below the maximum 
amount taxable as capital income. The idea behind the latter analysis is that the dividend-tax 
hike induced them to raise their dividends from a low level to the ‘tax-optimal’ level 
corresponding to the maximum amount taxable as capital income. These extensive margin 
responses are estimated by logit models. The intensive margin refers, in turn, to the actual 
amount of distributed dividends. For investment and debt equations, we only measure 
intensive margins. 
 
4.1 Extensive models 
 
We first investigate dividend initiations during the planning period of the tax reform in non-
listed firms.
15 If the anticipated tax increase affects dividend payments, we expect to see an 
increase in initiations prior to the reform. In Figure 4.1 we plot the distribution of dividends in 
years 2002, 2003 and 2004.  
The figure clearly shows that the proportion of firms that do not distribute dividends drops 
from 2002 to 2003 and again from 2003 to 2004. What is also evident is the increase in the 
share of firms that began to distribute dividends roughly equal to the maximum amount that 





                                                                                                                                                          
14 Again, these results are available from the authors upon request. 
15 Almost all listed firms have always distributed some dividends and therefore measuring new dividend distribu-
tions is not of much importance.   14
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Next, we examine the initiation of dividend distributions by estimating a logit model, where 
the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm initiates dividend distribution and 0 
otherwise.  
Our basic specification with group and time dummies is given in column (1) of Table 4.1. In 
the other models, we investigate the robustness of these results. The model with a firm-
specific dummy variable is given in column (2). This model is estimated as a linear 
probability model, since a panel logit model could suffer from the so-called incidental-
parameters problem leading to inconsistent estimates (Hsiao 2003, Ch. 7). The logit model is 
again used in the rest of the specifications. There, the firm dummy is dropped and we include 
the following control variables: a) a profit-to-assets ratio; b) 2-digit industry dummies; c) 
location dummies and d) the logarithm of the number of employees. In every specification we 
have reported coefficients of the estimated models and marginal effects (∂y/∂x) which show 
directly the impact of belonging to the group facing tax increases on the probability of 
dividend initiation.   15
 
Table 4.1: Initiation of dividend distributions in non-listed corporations 
 
 
                         (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  (5) 
 
 
                  Initiation   ∂y/∂x    Initiation   ∂y/∂x  Initiation   ∂y/∂x    Initiation   ∂y/∂x Initiation    ∂y/∂x 
 
Treatment03  1.357 0.027  0.113 0.113  1.727 0.028  1.731 0.029  1.693 0.048
  (41.28)** (23.56)**  (56.87)** (56.87)**  (41.32)** (22.21)**  (41.39)** (22.37)**  (37.68)**
 (25.13)** 
 
Treatment04  4.343  0.129 0.073  0.073 4.395    0.101 4.376  0.102 4.019  0.115 
  (59.49)** (74.68)**  (8.28)**  (8.28)**  (55.85)** (58.28)**  (55.57)** (58.54)**  (47.21)** (67.06)** 
      
Profit/assets        6.178   6.973  6.174   
        (102.40)**   (100.74)**   (102.41)**   
 
ln(employment)  -0.287  
  (47.15)**  
 
DUMMIES 
Group                 yes   yes   yes   yes      yes 
Firm   yes 
Year                  yes  yes    yes   yes    yes 
Industry              yes     yes   yes 
Location          yes    yes 
 
 
Constant  -7.893    -0.116  -8.271   -8.336    -7.799 
  (113.19)**                       (-24.85)**  (102.79)**   (102.39)**   (87.95)** 
 
 
Obs  499595    499595 444877 441882 318849 
 
Pseudo R
2  0.44                                   0.41    0.52  0.52  0.50 
  
 
Robust z statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
 
The results across specifications suggest that the number of firms distributing dividends 
increased as a response to both the Arvela tax plan in 2003 and the actual tax proposal in 
2004. As expected, the magnitude of the impact of the actual plan is somewhat higher than 
that of the preliminary Arvela report. The Arvela report increased the probability that a firm 
distributes dividends by 3–8 per cent depending on specification, whereas the corresponding 
increase resulting from the government plan was 10-13 per cent.
16 These results represent 
fairly large responses to the tax proposals. 
 
As well as initiating dividends payouts, firms were also able to exploit the tax advantages of 
the old system more efficiently just before the introduction of the new tax system. As 
                                                 
16 We interpret the marginal effects mainly based on the specifications 1 and 3-5. This is because specification 2 
is estimated as a linear probability model, which is in some sense a ‘wrong’ choice for limited dependent vari-
able modelling.   16
discussed above, the old system seems to have created incentives for non-listed companies to 
distribute as dividends the maximum amount taxable as capital income. Kari and Karikallio 
(2007) present evidence that a significant proportion of dividend-distributing non-listed 
corporations closely followed this rule in their pay-out policies. 
Therefore we also examine whether the expected dividend tax change increased the 
probability of firms distributing the maximum amount of normal dividends. We run a logit 
specification where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the firm started to distribute 
dividends equal to the maximum amount of normal dividends and 0 otherwise. We use the 
same set of regressors and controls as in our earlier analyses (Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2   Tax planning in non-listed corporations 
 
 
                        (1)   (2)   (3)  (4)   (5)   
 
 
                  Initiation   ∂y/∂x    Initiation   ∂y/∂x  Initiation   ∂y/∂x  Initiation   ∂y/∂x    Initiation   ∂y/∂x 
 
Treatment03  2.563 0.036 0.108 0.108 3.178 0.014 3.183 0.014 3.317 0.032   
  (38.50)** (14.49)** (98.07)** (98.07)**    (43.11)** (12.16)**    (43.17)** (12.19)** (39.79)** (12.07)**   
 
Treatment04  3.739 0.136 0.041    0.041 5.022 0.100 5.022 0.103 4.116 0.088   
  (37.26)** (13.38)** (8.53)**  (8.53)**  (40.02)** (11.45)** (39.98)** (11.45)** (30.76)** (9.88)** 
      
Profit/assets      10.295   10.756   10.296   
                        (107.93)**   (99.86)**   (108.00)**  
 
ln(employment)   0.034     
       (2.77)**     
 
DUMMIES 
Group  yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm yes 
Year                  yes    yes    yes   yes  yes     
Industry              yes   yes  yes    
Location  yes            yes     
 
 
Constant  -8.020                       0.009      -10.747  -10.700  -9.954   
  (92.07)**                  (5.08)**    (77.38)**   (75.91)**  (64.84)**    
 
 
Obs  499595 499595 444877 441882 319885 
 
Pseudo R
2  0.23                             0.05  0.42  0.42  0.42 
 
Robust z statistics in parentheses           




We find that much of the response in tax planning appeared in 2004; it was 9–14 per cent 
more probable that a firm would exploit the maximum amount of tax-free dividends if it fore-  17
saw an increase in dividend taxation after the reform. The first-round impacts in 2003 were 
much milder.  
We conclude that, in anticipation of a possible tax increase, firms took advantage of potential 
loopholes in the Finnish dividend tax system in force. We observe pre-reform increases in 
probabilities of initiation and of tax-planning, indicating that corporations prepared them-
selves for a tax increase.  
 
4.2 Intensive models 
 
 
In this subsection, we examine the change in the magnitude of dividends paid out. Thus our 
dependent variable is now continuous. We focus on firms that distributed dividends in every 
year of our sample and exclude firms with zero dividends paid out during some years. 
Non-Listed Corporations 
 
Table 4.3 below reports the results of the dividend regressions for non-listed corporations. 
The dummy variables and other controls are the same as earlier. Coefficients of the treatment 
variables are statistically significant in all model specifications. The results reveal that the 
amount of dividends increased in a significant way in firms that anticipated higher taxes in the 
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Table 4.3    Dividend responses in non-listed corporations 
 
 
              (1)  (2)   (3)     (4)   (5) 
 
Dependent variable: Dividend/assets 
 
Treatment03  0.005 0.006 0.004 0.004    0.003 
  (4.93)**  (6.46)**   (4.45)**   (4.46)**   (3.18)** 
 
Treatment04  0.013 0.008 0.012 0.011 0.011 
  (6.04)** (3.67)** (6.00)** (5.93)** (5.93)** 
 
Profit/assets    0.282  0.282      0.293 
    (80.06)**      (80.08)**    (76.98)** 
 
ln(employment)   -0.006 
     (45.80)** 
DUMMIES 
Group         yes  yes  yes      yes   yes 
Firm   yes 
Year               yes  yes   yes   yes   yes 
Industry         yes    yes   yes 
Location      yes   yes 
 
 
Constant  0.037 0.077 0.009    0.011 0.066 
 (20.26)**  (30.26)**    (4.86)**  (5.61)**    (25.68)** 
 
Obs.  161779 161779 156731 156731 137443 
 
R-squared      0.28 0.17 0.42 0.42 0.44 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
 
From our data, the mean of the dividends/assets variable for non-listed firms in the period 
2003–2004 was 0.04551. The increase in dividends consequent to the anticipated tax increase 
was therefore 7–13 per cent in 2003 and 18–29 per cent in 2004. While it may not be 
surprising that firms reacted to the dividend tax hike, the magnitude of the increase is, in our 
view, quite considerable. 
Finally, one may wonder what would happen to the results if the whole distribution is 
modelled at the same time. To test this, we include the zero values of dividends to the sample 
and estimate a standard Tobit model. These results, reported in Appendix 2, are comparable to 
those reported in Table 4.3. Therefore, the choice of estimation technique does not seem to 
drive the results. 
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Listed Corporations 
 
The response to the dividend tax reform proposals may differ across listed and non-listed 
firms. The following part analyses the response by the firms listed on the stock exchange. 
Under the reform proposals, the greatest increase in dividend taxation was faced by listed 
companies with individual Finnish owners. On the other hand, listed companies owned by 
institutional or foreign shareholders did not face big changes in dividend taxation. 
Table 4.4   Dividend responses in listed corporations   
 
  (1)   (2)  (3)   (4)  (5) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Dividend/assets  
 
Treatment03         0.026  0.029  0.019  0.019   0.024 
  (4.20)**  (2.42)*  (3.01)**              (2.96)**              (3.25)** 
 
Treatment04  0.003 0.047 0.006 0.004 0.0001 
  (0.53) (4.26)**  (0.85) (0.54) (0.05)
  
 
Profit/assets     0.492 0.492 0.488 
      (3.96)**              (3.90)**               (3.88)** 
 
ln(employment)   -0.011 
   (4.58)** 
 
DUMMIES 
Group  yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm yes 
Year                                   yes  yes                      yes                      yes    yes                    
Industry                                                                     yes                       yes  yes 
Location                                                                                                yes  yes 
   
Constant    0.056 0.063 0.048      0.070 0.199 




Obs  595 595 588    585 573 
  
R-squared   0.17  0.28  0.33    0.33       0.38 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         




Table 4.4 summarizes the results of these estimations. The coefficients measuring the reaction 
in 2003 are statistically significant in all cases, whereas the additional impact from the 
Government plan in 2004 is typically not significant, except for specification (2). Perhaps the 
reason is that for quoted firms, the contents of the Arvela plan and the Government plan were 
essentially the same. Given that the mean of the dividends/assets ratio in 2003 was 0.05521,   20
the marginal impact of the Arvela report on the amount of dividends distributed was 34–47 
per cent. This is a much greater response than in the case of non-listed companies. 
 
4.3 Calculating losses in tax revenues 
 
The value of the treatment parameters, together with the amount of dividends in the category 
of treated firms enables us to give an estimate of the tax revenue losses the government 
suffered owing to the timing of the dividend decisions.  
The idea is as follows. The treatment dummy variables tell how much the firms that 
anticipated a tax increase advanced their dividend payments to the period before the tax 
reform. As we saw, the actual magnitude of these parameters varied from specification to 
specification. We therefore take the mean value of the treatment parameter values. The actual 
dividends paid out by the treated firms in 2003 and 2004 include these additional dividends, 
and taking out the magnitude equal to the marginal effect of the mean of the treatment 
variable gives the value of the additional dividends. Without the tax reform, we assume that 
they would have not been paid before the reform. Therefore it is plausible to expect that these 
additional dividends were then missing from the tax base after the reform. 
The value of the dividends in the listed and non-listed firms in the treated categories in 2003 
and 2004 was roughly a billion euros, and the overall value of additional dividends was 210 
million euros (See Table 4.5 below). After the tax reform, 70% of this amount would have 
become taxed at the flat capital income tax rate of 28%. This means that the overall tax 
revenue loss would have amounted to 41 million euros. Before the reform, the government 
estimated that the overall increase in dividend tax receipts could be approximately 150 
million euros per year. Therefore, the tax revenue loss took away 27 per cent of the increase 
in dividend tax revenues in the first year (if all losses were realized in that year). Whether this 
is a small or large revenue loss is, of course, debatable. But had the dividend tax increase been 
more wide-ranging than it actually was (because, in the end, only dividends exceeding 90,000 
euros were taxable in non-listed companies), the euro amount of the revenue loss would have 
been larger as well. 
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Table 4.5   Estimating tax revenue losses 
 
 
5. Financing the additional dividends 
 
Since dividends increased, the question arises of how this is reflected in the firms’ other 
decisions. One alternative is that investments could have decreased. This can have happened 
for two reasons. First, if firms are liquidity constrained, paying out some of their funds as 
dividends reduces their resources available for investments. Second, an increase in dividend 
taxation in the future may reduce the incentives for investment already earlier. This can 
happen if an investor foresees that an investment provides return after a few years, but the net-
of-tax return of the investment is lowered because at the future period, dividends paid out 
from the profitable investment are already subject to heavier taxes. There are reasons to 
believe, however, that we should not observe a difference in investments between our 
treatment and control groups affected by this profitability channel. First, as explained in the 
introduction, according to the ‘new view’, dividend taxes do not affect investments of mature 
corporations. Second, Hietala and Kari (2006) analyse the tax rules for dividends from 
Finnish non-listed firms, and claim that the effects of the 2005 reform on the cost capital of 
non-listed corporations is very mixed and depends much on the circumstances of the owner 
and the firm. This would mean that the main potential effect on investments might well come 
through the cash flow channel.      
Even if investments would not react, the balance sheet position of firms could change due to 
increased dividends so that, for example, indebtedness increases. In this section we will 
investigate the effects on both investments and indebtedness.  
 
 
  Amount of dividends, t € 
Mean treatment  
parameter,%  Increase in dividends, t € 
 2003  2004  2003  2004 2003  2004 
Listed 507,479  367,383  25  28  101,496  80,365 
          
Non-
listed 80,714  78,395  18  26  12,312  16,177   22
5.1 Investment responses 
 
We first consider investment responses. The models are similar to those used in the dividend 
regressions, but we now also include two additional control variables: capital adequacy, 
measured by equity/debt, and the growth rate in the firm’s turnover. The results for listed 
firms are reported in Table 5.1 and the results for non-listed firms in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.1  Investment responses in listed corporations   
 
                                          (1)   (2)                      (3)                        (4)  (5) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Investment/assets  
 
Treatment03  -0.012 -0.025 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 
  (1.12)  (1.71)   (0.52)   (0.63)   (0.51) 
 
Treatment04  -0.001  0.008 0.010 0.011 0.011 
  (0.22) (0.54) (1.20) (1.08) (1.11) 
 
Profit/assets    0.014    -0.019    -0.006 
        (0.29)   (0.38)   (0.12) 
 
Growth  rate    0.026  0.025  0.030 
                                          (1.61)   (1.50)   (1.72) 
 
Equity/debt                             0.103   0.089   0.101 
                                           (2.38)*   (2.23)*   (2.33)* 
 
ln(employment)   -0.007 
                                    (2.04)* 
DUMMIES 
Group  yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm   yes 
Year                             yes   yes   yes  yes  yes 
Industry                          yes   yes    yes 
Location                             yes   yes 
 
Constant                                 0.057   0.055  0.148   0.175   0.196 
  (5.82)**   (7.92)**  (7.20)**   (7.38)**   (3.75)** 
 
 
Obs.  690 690 435    433    427 
R-squared  0.14  0.21    0.24   0.30   0.31 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses           
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Table 5.2:  Weighted investment responses in non-listed corporations 
 
        (1)  (2)     (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
 Dependent variable: Investment/assets, weighted by turnover  
 
Treatment03        0.014  -0.011    -0.024   -0.023   -0.024 
               (0.13)  (0.13)   (0.17)   (0.16)   (0.17) 
 
Treatment04  -0.006 -0.001 0.014  0.013  0.014 
  (0.06) (0.00) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
  
Profit/assets             0.076  0.076   0.070 
                       (30.17)**   (30.31)**   (26.88)**         
 
Equity/debt   -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
    (13.19)**    (13.22)**    (17.50)** 
 
Growth rate       -0.001    0.001   0.003 
    (1.38)    (1.28)    (3.28)** 
 
ln(employment)       -0.012 
   (47.73)** 
DUMMIES 
Group      yes   yes   yes     yes    yes  
Firm   yes 
Year           yes   yes   yes    yes   yes 
Industry        yes    yes   yes 
Location          yes yes 
 
Constant                0.118   0.099  0.084    0.092    0.109 
            (98.08)**   (98.98)**  (55.96)**   (59.01)**   (66.26)** 
 
Obs.             229321   227125  179117   179005  168593 
R-squared  0.04  0.46    0.25    0.25    0.28 
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
    
 
An interesting pattern in the investment results emerges. For both listed firms and for non-
listed firms in general, there appears to be no link between the anticipated tax change and 
investment prior the reform. For the non-listed firms, this result holds for the weighted 
regressions (as those shown in Table 5.2), where the firms’ size (their turnover) is used as a 
weight. One possible explanation is that the level of investment decisions is relatively 
inflexible in the short period of our analysis. Or it may imply that investments can be financed 
by other sources of funds and therefore the treatment of dividends is not of paramount 
importance (as in the ‘new view’ of dividend taxation). 
However, when the smallest firms are given the same weight as all other firms, one obtains 
negative and statistically significant effects from the tax change on investments (See 
Appendix 3).
17 The reason is probably that the smallest control group firms are micro-sized, 
growing firms where investment-to-asset ratios are large anyway. For investment equations, 
we prefer the weighted estimation, since there the bigger (control group) firms get a larger   24
weight. This is desirable since these firms are a closer comparison to the actual treated firms 
that are relatively large. 
 
 
5.2 Debt financing 
 
 
Let us now consider the reaction in the debt/assets ratio. One of the motivations for the earlier 
tax reform in 1993, when Finland moved to a Nordic dual income tax system, was to increase 
the attractiveness of equity finance and to reduce the vulnerability of firms to external shocks. 
Without considering whether these incentives actually went too far – Lindhe et al. (2004) 
argue that the cost of capital in the form of equity was very low in the previous tax regime in 
Finland – the 2005 tax reform clearly reduced the incentives for reducing leverage for some 
firms (Hietala and Kari 2006). The debt regressions below reveal that in non-listed firms 
which anticipated tax increases, the stock of debt also increased. The increased dividend 
distributions were therefore partially funded by an increase in indebtedness. There was no 
similar effect in listed firms, which may more often have other items in their balance sheets to 











                                                                                                                                                          
17 All other results reported in the paper remain qualitatively the same regardless of whether these weights are 
used or not.    25
Table 5.3    Debt responses in listed corporations 
 
              (1)  (2)   (3)     (4)   (5) 
 
Dependent variable: Debt/assets 
 
Treatment03  -0.007 -0.007 -0.013 -0.015    -0.021 
  (0.36)  (0.46)   (0.65)   (0.75)   (1.05) 
 
Treatment04  -0.013 -0.025 -0.007 -0.004 0.004 
  (0.71) (1.71) (0.38) (0.22) (0.21) 
 
Profit/assets    -0.240  -0.230      -0.232 
      (2.97)**    (2.93)**   (3.08)** 
 
ln(employment)   0.015 
     (5.96)** 
DUMMIES 
Group         yes  yes  yes      yes   yes 
Firm   yes 
Year               yes  yes   yes   yes   yes 
Industry         yes    yes   yes 
Location      yes   yes 
 
 
Constant  0.212 0.201 0.234    0.191 -0.053 
 (20.67)**  (25.61)**    (7.38)**  (5.30)**    (1.06) 
 
Obs.  710 710 693 690 674 
R-squared    0.02  0.02  0.20    0.23  0.29 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%          
 
Table 5.4    Debt responses in non-listed corporations 
 
              (1)  (2)   (3)     (4)   (5) 
 
Dependent variable: Debt/assets 
 
Treatment03  0.063 0.075 0.068 0.068 0.079 
  (33.87)**  (40.82)**   (35.78)**   (35.67)**   (37.98)** 
 
Treatment04  0.052 0.050 0.052 0.053 0.042 
  (11.26)** (8.40)**  (10.65)** (10.74)** (8.34)** 
 
Profit/assets    -0.228  -0.230      -0.252 
    (61.55)**      (61.43)**    (55.66)** 
 
ln(employment)   0.015 
     (56.11)** 
DUMMIES 
Group         yes  yes  yes      yes   yes 
Firm   yes 
Year               yes  yes   yes   yes   yes 
Industry         yes    yes   yes 
Location      yes   yes 
 
 
Constant  0.363  0.245   0.352   0.348  0.353 
  (312.29)** (84.76)**    (213.67)** (203.46)**    (185.22)** 
 
Obs.  415051   415051  388242    385414  283885 
 
R-squared    0.12  0.03    0.16  0.16  0.24 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       




This paper examines how Finnish corporations adjusted their dividend distributions and 
investments in anticipation of the 2005 corporate and capital income tax reform. Since the 
reform treated different types of corporations in different ways, it involved exogenous 
variations to their tax treatment, offering an opportunity for promising empirical estimates. 
The results can be used to shed light on three distinct issues: the debate between the ‘old’ vs. 
the ‘new’ view of dividend taxation, the strength of anticipatory responses, and the design of 
the dual income tax. Since we have measured only reactions on a short term, the conclusions 
regarding the long-term effects should be seen as tentative. 
We find that firms which anticipated increased tax on dividend distributions increased their 
dividend payouts in a statistically significant way prior to the reform. This took place both at 
the extensive margin and at the intensive margin. However, this was not reflected in a 
reduction in investment activity, except when the smallest firms are included in the control 
group. There is also evidence that in non-listed firms the increased dividend distributions 
were partially funded by increasing debt. Therefore, the tax linkage between dividends and 
financial structure appears to be more direct than that of investments. This behaviour can be, 
at least cautiously, seen as consistent with the ‘new view’ of dividend taxation, according to 
which the timing of dividends is adjusted, whereas investment behaviour remains untouched.  
Secondly, the results imply that while companies distributed abnormally high dividends 
before the reform, they tended to pay out abnormally low dividends after the reform. This tax 
planning behaviour therefore probably reduced dividend tax receipts for a few years after the 
reform. According to our calculations, the revenue losses amounted to roughly 30% of 
predicted annual investor-level dividend tax receipts. The Finnish capital income tax reform 
was publicly debated extensively and for quite a long time. This seems to have had both 
positive and negative effects. The public discussion might have corrected misguided policies 
in the first tax reform proposal, but it also made the tax reform vulnerable to lobbying. And 
during the process, firms found ample time to organize their financial structure to minimize 
their tax burden over time.   27
Finally, we find that the prospect of increased dividend taxation pushed the firms to make the 
most out of the tax-planning opportunities embodied in the Finnish version of the dual income 
tax system. In particular, more firms started to distribute dividends up to the maximum level 
taxed at the more lenient capital income tax rate. This suggests that the tax-planning 
incentives of the dual income tax system must indeed be taken seriously, and these incentives, 
as well as incentives on capital accumulation and financial structure, need to be designed in a 
more rigorous manner.   28
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Appendix 1 : The role of group definition 
 
Shares of the firms that have switched the group (%) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1. Listed corporations the majority of shares owned by foreign or domestic 
institutional investors
5 . 16 . 58 . 16 . 72 . 1
2. Listed corporations with a large share of domestic ownership  8.6 8.7 6.5 3.0 7.1
3. Non-listed corporations with dividends taxed as earned income at the 
margin
7 . 44 . 38 . 83 . 48 . 2
4. Non-listed corporations with dividends taxed at the margin as capital 
income, maximum dividend payment below 90,000 euros
8 . 97 . 46 . 87 . 37 . 9
5. Non-listed corporations with dividends taxed at the margin as capital 
income, maximum dividend payment above 90,000 euros
9.9 8.4 14.2 14.9 11.8
 
 
Sensitivity analysis of estimation models in different definitions of corporate group number 5 
Estimated models include the total control set. 
 
coeff. Robust z ∂y/∂x Robust z coeff. Robust z ∂y/∂x Robust z
Treatment03 1.007 (9.03)** 0.042 (6.45)** 4.963 (31.70)** 0.016 (16.61)**
Treatment04 5.299 (68.31)** 0.184 (155.97)** 2.224 (8.25)** 0.001 (3.32)**
Treatment03 1.693 (37.68)** 0.048 (25.13)** 3.317 (39.79)** 0.032 (12.07)** 
Treatment04 4.019 (47.21)** 0.115 (67.06)** 4.116 (30.76)** 0.088 (9.88)**
Treatment03 1.692 (38.60)** 0.044 (25.55)** 2.626 (34.89)** 0.056 (13.46)**
Treatment04 3.587 (44.45)** 0.093 (60.40)** 3.311 (25.66)** 0.130 (9.74)**




Maximum dividend payment above
 
 
coeff. Robust z coeff. Robust z coeff. Robust z
Treatment03 0.009 (3.55)** -0.011 (1.41) 0.098 (17.42)**
Treatment04 0.004 (1.52) -0.019 (3.34)** 0.025 (5.24)**
Treatment03 0.003 (3.18)** -0.024 (0.17) 0.079 (37.98)**
Treatment04 0.011 (5.93)** 0.014 (0.10) 0.042 (8.34)**
Treatment03 0.004 (4.20)** 0.007 (0.62) 0.076 (36.97)**










* Used in the estimation results in the text 
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Appendix 2: Modelling the whole distribution by Tobit 
 
 




              (1)  (2)   (3)     (4)    
 
Dependent variable: Dividend/assets 
 
Treatment03  0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008   
  (27.12)**  (25.06)**   (24.87)**   (20.23)**   
 
Treatment04  0.009    0.009 0.009 0.008   
  (7.16)** (6.13)** (6.12)** (5.43)**   
 
Profit/assets    0.067  0.088 
    (149.42)**      (149.59)** 
  
 
ln(employment)   -0.002 
   (32.65)** 
        
DUMMIES 
Group         yes  yes  yes      yes    
Firm    
Year               yes  yes   yes   yes    
Industry                                                                                               yes    yes  yes    
Location                                                                                                                                  yes   yes 
 
 
Constant -0.018  0.019  0.019    0.015 
  (69.46)** (55.21)**    (53.87)** (34.07)**     
 
Obs.  499595 444913 441918 319905 
 
R-squared      0.15 0.20 0.20 0.20   
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
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        (1)  (2)     (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
 Dependent variable: Investment/assets   
 
Treatment03        -0.007  -0.002    -0.006   -0.006   -0.005 
               (5.75)**  (1.44)   (4.45)**   (4.57)**   (3.44)** 
 
Treatment04  -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 
  (3.01)** (2.11)*  (2.80)** (2.83)** (2.98)** 
  
Profit/assets             0.038  0.039   0.037 
                       (8.61)**   (8.77)**   (7.85)**         
 
Equity/debt   -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
    (16.63)**    (16.46)**    (20.43)** 
 
Growth rate       0.006    0.006   0.010 
    (8.24)**    (8.42)**    (10.96)** 
 
ln(employment)       -0.010 
   (40.77)** 
 
DUMMIES 
Group      yes   yes   yes     yes    yes  
Firm   yes 
Year           yes   yes   yes    yes   yes 
Industry        yes    yes   yes 
Location          yes yes 
 
Constant                0.109   0.096  0.088    0.092    0.109 
            (103.06)**   (87.26)**  (67.63)**   (67.04)**   (67.86)** 
 
 
Obs.             254297   254297  179349   179172  160805 
 
R-squared  0.02  0.02    0.05    0.05    0.07 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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